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Abstract
Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reli-
able predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian 
games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the con-
sequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a 
class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
JEL classification: C72
Keywords: Large games; Hindsight stability; Ex-post Nash equilibria; Bayesian Nash equilibria
1. Introduction
Hindsight stability, also referred to as ex-post robustness, is an important property of equi-
libria of one-shot simultaneous-move Bayesian games. An equilibrium of a Bayesian game is 
hindsight-stable if no player has an incentive to change her action after she learns the realized 
types and the realized actions of all the players. Equilibria that are not hindsight-stable may not 
provide useful predictions of outcomes in games in which players can revise choices based on 
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(see Section 1.1 for examples).
There is a substantial literature devoted to issues of stability in games with many players, or 
large games. Kalai [15] shows that all equilibria in a certain class of large games are structurally 
robust, a stronger property that implies hindsight stability.1 However, the restrictions on the class 
of games in Kalai [15] leave out many important real-life situations. The first restriction is that the 
number of possible types and actions of the players be finite. Second, when a player evaluates her 
payoffs, she is restricted to viewing all her opponents as anonymous or indistinguishable. Both 
these assumptions severely limit the applicability of the results.
The main objective of this paper is to characterize an important family of large games not 
restricted by assumptions of finiteness and anonymity and, yet, in which all equilibria are still 
hindsight-stable.
We consider a general family of Bayesian games in which players’ types and action spaces 
are compact subsets of finite dimensional Euclidean spaces, and in which players’ types are 
drawn independently. We assume that payoffs can depend on types and actions of specific rivals 
in asymmetric ways, but subject to two regularity conditions: “Uniform Lipschitz Continuity 
in one’s own types and actions”, and “Uniform Scaled Lipschitz Continuity in rivals’ types and 
actions.” In the main result of this paper, we show that these two conditions are sufficient to guar-
antee that all equilibria of these games become approximately hindsight-stable at an exponential 
rate as the number of players increases.
The regularity conditions we impose on the payoff functions are interesting in their own right. 
In particular, the Uniform Scaled Lipschitz continuity with respect to rivals implies that a player 
has a limited individual impact on her opponents and that the impact decreases with the total 
number of players in the game.2 Limited individual impact does not imply anonymity and, as we 
illustrate in examples below, is far from assuming that players become approximately symmetric.
From a mathematical point of view, the limited individual impact condition allows us to apply 
a powerful law of large numbers: McDiarmid’s Bounded Differences Inequality. This law and its 
variants may be useful in a variety of economic settings.3
The proof of the main result is done in three steps. In the first step, we establish a basic rela-
tionship between realized payoffs and expected payoffs in a Bayesian game: In particular, we use 
McDiarmid’s Inequality to prove that the realized payoff of any player from playing a particular 
strategy is close to the ex-ante expected payoff from that strategy, with a high probability, as long 
as the number of players is large. Second, we use this result to establish a result about conver-
gence to hindsight stability in games with a finite number of possible types and actions. Finally, 
by approximating a general (infinite) game by a finite counterpart (its finite grid reduction game), 
we show that the convergence to hindsight stability holds in general.
Hindsight stability relates to other important issues in economic applications: It implies that 
mixed strategies self-purify (see Kalai [15] and Cartwright and Wooders [7]); it implies a strong 
rational expectations property in certain market games (see Kalai [15,17]); and it implies that the 
revelation principle holds in implementation problems (see Green and Laffont [13]). Robustness 
1 Kalai [15] illustrated that a property called extensive stability holds for a certain family of large games. But Kalai 
[16,17] argues that these games satisfy a stronger property, called structural stability.
2 Different bounds on the informational size or influence of players have been presented before. See, for example, 
Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [1], McLean and Postlewaite [21] and references therein.
3 Unlike classical laws of large numbers, which deal with the expected value of the average of random variables, this 
law deals with the expected value of any function of the variables in which the impact of individual variables is limited.
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tions and computing (see Halpern [14]). In particular, robust equilibria perform better in systems 
that involve asynchronous communications (see Kalai [16]), and in protocols that involve faulty 
behavior (see Gradwohl and Reingold [11]).
Related current work on equilibrium robustness in large games includes Gradwohl and Rein-
gold [12], who study robustness of Bayesian equilibria in games that allow certain correlations 
between players’ types.4 Carmona and Podczeck [6] present a result on approximate ex-post sta-
bility of Bayesian equilibria in large games with infinite type and action spaces but, unlike us, 
they assume anonymity. However, they allow for infinite dimensional type and action spaces, 
and for discontinuity in one’s own type and action. Other recent work on large games includes 
Azrieli and Shmaya [4], who study purification in large non-anonymous complete-information 
games, and Bodoh-Creed [5], who studies implementation in large games.
1.1. Illustrative examples
Before we go into the formal model and results, we first present some examples that illustrate 
the results we have about hindsight stability in games.
Example 1 (A location game with men and women). Simultaneously, n male players, m1, m2,
. . .mn, and n female players, f1, f2, . . . , fn, choose locations, lmj and lfi , in the interval [0, 1]. 
Men want to be close to the women, but women want to be far from the men. Specifically, 
each female player’s utility is ufi = 1n
∑n
j=1 |lfi − lmj |, whereas each male player’s utility is 
umi = 1 − 1n
∑n
j=1 |lmi − lfj |.5
At a symmetric equilibrium of this game, all the men choose to locate at 12 , and each woman 
chooses between 0 and 1 with equal probability.6 Clearly, with a small, odd number of players, 
such an equilibrium is not hindsight-stable. Our main result implies that asymptotically, as n
becomes large, all equilibria of the location game become hindsight-stable. Specifically, for an 
arbitrarily small positive number ε, the probability of the event that “some player can gain more 
than ε by unilaterally revising her action ex-post” decreases to zero at an exponential rate as n
becomes large.
In the next example, we consider a game with heterogeneous players.
Example 2 (Heterogeneous payoff functions). Consider a location game as above, but with play-
ers gi , g = 1, 2, . . . , G, for some fixed integer G, and i = 1, 2, . . . , n (nG players in total). The 
index g denotes groups, such as genders, tribes, nationalities, races or combinations of such char-
acteristics, and i names the player within a group. Each player chooses a point lgi in a set Cgi , 
subset of some fixed compact set in Rm.
Players have heterogeneous payoff functions that depend on the identity of their specific op-
ponents. A simple example may be a player 53 who values the proximity to other players in an
4 They obtain a result with limited hindsight stability for non-anonymous players.
5 This is a generalization of the Village vs. Beach game (Kalai [15]) with a continuum of actions.
6 At other equilibria, all the men choose 12 , and every woman chooses, purely or randomly, one of the two extremes. 
For odd n, some females must randomize.
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∑G
g=1( 12 )
|g−5|∑n
i=1 1nd(l53, lgi ), 
where d(x, y) is the distance between x and y.
The payoff function u53 satisfies the regularity conditions required in our setting. In particular, 
the rate of change of u53 , as one changes the location of any one opponent, decreases to zero as 
the number of players increases. Thus, players have limited individual impact. However, while 
individual opponents become of negligible importance, they are far from being equally unimpor-
tant. No matter how large n is, for player 53, the average location of the players in group 5 is 
twice as important as that of players in group 6, which is twice as important as that of players in 
group 7, etc. Our main result implies that in this example, as the number of players increases, all 
equilibria become hindsight-stable.
It is worthwhile to note that, as stated, Example 2 can still be re-cast as a semi-anonymous 
game and viewed as a special case of Kalai [15]. However, this is no longer true if the number of 
groups becomes infinite (or increases with n).
Example 3. Consider the same game as in Example 2 with players gi , but with the number of 
possible groups g = 1, 2, . . . , n, so that there are n2 players. Suppose that the payoff function for 
player 53 is: u53 =
∑n
g=1( 12 )
|g−5|∑n
j=1 1n2 d(l53 − lgj ).
Such a game satisfies the conditions in this paper, but cannot be accommodated in the earlier 
Kalai model. The heterogeneity of types allowed in our setting goes significantly further than in 
the example above. For instance, the payoff functions need not treat opponents within a group 
symmetrically.
Example 4 (Bayesian Cournot game). The players are n sellers, each having the capacity to pro-
duce up to k units of an identical divisible product. The price-quantity relationship is described 
by the demand function: p = 1 − q/n.7 Each seller i knows his per-unit production costs ci – 
i.e., his type, which is randomly drawn by a commonly known prior probability distribution μi
over some fixed interval of real numbers Ii . With knowledge of his own type, each player decides 
on a production level 0 ≤ xi ≤ k, resulting in a profile (c, x), of individual costs and quantities. 
The resulting payoff of player i is ui(c, x) = xi(1 −∑nj=1 xj/n − ci).
In Bayesian Cournot games, pure strategy equilibria may not exist.8 Even when an equilibrium 
exists, if the number of players is small, the quantity choices are likely to be hindsight-unstable. 
Our result establishes that if there are a large number of producers (and buyers), any Bayesian 
equilibrium is approximately hindsight-stable.
Two additional properties are direct consequences of our result. First, hindsight-stability 
means that the realized pure actions will constitute an (approximate) equilibrium of the complete-
information game determined by the realized types. In this sense, the Bayesian equilibrium is 
(asymptotically) self-purifying.9 Second, in every Bayesian equilibrium, the realized actions will 
7 A simple interpretation is that there are n buyers, each with a demand function q = 1 − p.
8 See discussion and references in Einy et al. [10].
9 This property is significantly stronger than (simple) purification, which originated the study of large strategic games. 
See Schmeidler [24] and the follow-up literature. Under simple purification, one simply establishes the existence of a 
pure-strategy equilibrium.
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ing competitive equilibrium as the limit of Cournot games is not new,10 here, it is an immediate 
consequence of our result in the more general context of Bayesian games. Moreover, it is not ob-
tained at a particular equilibrium, but is the (asymptotic) property of every Bayesian equilibrium.
2. Model
Let T denote the space of feasible types of players, and let A denote the space of all feasible 
actions of players. We assume that T and A are fixed subsets of some Euclidean spaces. We 
will consider a family  = (T , A ) of Bayesian games G(N, T , A, τ, {ui}) that can each be 
described as follows.
• There are N players {i = 1, . . . , N}.
• The type of each player i is drawn independently from a type-space Ti , where Ti is a compact 
subset of T . Players are informed about their own type. Let T denote the type space of 
all players – i.e., T := ∏i=1,...,N Ti . Let τ be a probability measure on the Borel subsets 
of T . Under the independence assumption (assumed throughout the paper), τ is the product 
measure of its marginal distributions on each Ti , denoted by τi . The type distributions are 
common knowledge.
• Each player i chooses actions from her action space Ai which is a compact subset of A . Let 
A denote the space of action profiles of all players – i.e., A :=∏i=1...,N Ai .
We refer to a pair (ti, ai) := ci as a type-action character of player i (often abbreviated to 
character). Denote the space of a player’s type-action characters Ti × Ai as Ci . Denote the 
space of type-action character profiles as C =∏i Ci . For any player i, we denote the space 
of type-action characters of her rivals as C−i :=∏j =i Tj × Aj .• Players’ payoffs are given by bounded measurable functions ui : C → R. For convenience, 
we sometimes use the derived functions ucii (c−i ) : C−i →R where ucii (c−i ) = ui(ci, c−i ).
Definition 1 (Uniformly bounded strategy space). A family of games  = (T , A ) is said to 
have a uniformly bounded strategy space if T is a compact subset of RkT , and A is a compact 
subset of RkA for some fixed integers kT , kA > 0.
We define the standard L1-metric to be d(x, y) =∑Mm=1 |xm − ym| for any x, y ∈ RM . We 
consider families of games with uniformly bounded strategy spaces, and with payoff functions 
that satisfy the following two regularity conditions.
Definition 2 (LC1: Uniform K-Lipschitz continuity in one’s own character). Given K ≥ 0, the 
payoff functions ui in a family of games (T , A ) are said to be uniformly K-Lipschitz con-
tinuous in one’s own character, if for every player i, any character profile c and any type-action 
character of player i, c′i ,
|ui(ci, c−i ) − ui(c′i , c−i )| < K d(ci, c′i ),
where d(., .) is the L1 metric.
10 See Mas-Colell [18], Novshek and Sonnenschein [23] and the follow-up literature.
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Definition 3 (LC2: Uniform scaled l-Lipschitz continuity in rival character profile). Given 
L ≥ 0, the payoff functions ui in a family of games (T , A ) are said to be Uniformly Scaled 
L-Lipschitz Continuous in the rivals’ type-action character, if for every N -player game in 
(T , A ), for every player i, for any c, c′−i ,
|ui(ci, c−i ) − ui(ci, c′−i )| <
L
N − 1 d(c−i , c
′−i )
where d(., .) is the L1 metric.
Notice that the Lipschitz bound L is uniform for all N in the family of games.
Next, we define a strategy in this environment. Defining mixed strategies as maps from types 
to mixtures over pure strategies has the drawback that they are not well-defined in games with a 
continuum of types (see Aumann [2]). We use the notion of distributional strategies as introduced 
by Milgrom and Weber [22]. A distributional strategy is simply another way of representing 
mixed and/or behavioral strategies.
Definition 4 (Distributional strategy). A distributional strategy for player i is a probability mea-
sure σi on the Borel subsets of Ti ×Ai for which the marginal distribution of Ti coincides with τi . 
Formally, for any S ⊂ Ti , σi(S ×Ai) = τi(S). When players use distributional strategies, the ex-
pected payoff of player i is defined as follows:
Ui(σ ) =
∫
ui(c)dσ (c),
where, for a profile of distribution strategies, we let σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) denote the product distri-
bution over 
∏
(Ti × Ai) = C.
Definition 5 (Equilibrium). A profile of (distributional) strategies σ ∗ is an equilibrium11 if
For all i, σ ′i , Ui(σ ∗1 , . . . σ ∗i , . . . σ ∗N) ≥ Ui(σ ∗1 , . . . σ ′i , . . . , σ ∗N).
Since we prove robustness properties of equilibria asymptotically, as the number of players 
increases, we need to define a notion of approximate equilibrium.
Definition 6 (ε-Best response). Let ε > 0 (small). A strategy σ ∗i is an ε-best response for player 
i to σ−i if for every positive-probability set of player i’s types, T˜i ⊂ Ti (with τi(T˜i) > 0), the fol-
lowing condition holds: Ui((σ ′i , σ−i)|T˜i ) − Ui((σ ∗i , σ−i )|T˜i ) ≤ ε for all distributional strategies 
σ ′i of player i.
Note that here, we define the best response for a player in an interim sense, i.e. after a player 
observes his own realized type (as is standard in the study of equilibria of Bayesian games).
11 In this paper, we are not concerned about existence of equilibria, since our objective is to establish stability proper-
ties of equilibria where they exist. Note that independence of types and uniform continuity of payoff functions deliver 
existence of an equilibrium in distributional strategies.
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response to σ ∗−i .
Finally, we introduce the appropriate notion of robustness, which we call hindsight stability. 
A type-action profile is hindsight-stable for a player if she does not want to change her action even 
after she observes the realized types and actions of her rivals. Formally, we define approximate 
hindsight stability as follows.
Definition 8 (Approximate hindsight stability). A type-action character profile c = (t, a) is 
ε-hindsight-stable for player i if ui((ti , a˜i ), c−i ) − ui(c) ≤ ε for all a˜i ∈ Ai . The type-action 
character profile is ε-hindsight-stable, if it is ε-hindsight-stable for all players. A strategy profile 
σ ∗ is (ε, ρ)-hindsight-stable if it yields ε-hindsight-stable type-action profiles with probability 
at least 1 − ρ.
Note that an equilibrium is approximately hindsight-stable if the realized actions, not the 
mixed actions, constitute an approximate Nash equilibrium of the realized complete-information 
game.
2.1. Games with limited individual impact
It is worth emphasizing that LC2 and uniform boundedness of the strategy space, together, 
imply a property that we call “limited individual impact (LII).” LII means that the effect that any 
player can unilaterally have on an opponent’s payoff is uniformly bounded and decreases with 
the number of players in the game.
Definition 9 (λ-Limited individual impact). Given λ ≥ 0, players in games in (T , A ) are said 
to have λ-limited individual impact if the set of payoff functions {ui} satisfies the following 
condition:
For all i, for all type-action characters c, c′, |ui(ci, c−i ) − ui(ci, c′−i )| ≤
λ
N − 1 ,
whenever c−i , c′−i differ only in one coordinate.
The LII property does not imply anonymity or even asymptotic anonymity.12
Lemma 1. Let (T , A ) be a family of games with a uniformly bounded strategy space and sat-
isfying the Uniform Scaled L-Lipschitz Continuity in rival character profiles. Then, there exists 
a constant λ ≥ 0 such that players in (T , A ) satisfy the λ-limited individual impact condition.
Proof. Consider any game in (T , A ), and fix any player i. For any two type-action character 
profiles of player i’s rivals c−i and c′−i that differ only in one coordinate, the distance between the 
two profiles is less than some upper bound B . The existence of such an upper bound follows from 
12 Recent work by Azrieli [3] on conjectural categorical equilibrium also uses the notion of individual impact being 
inversely proportional to the number of players. Azrieli and Shmaya [4] define a related property called “maximal impact” 
in their work related to purification of equilibria in games with complete information. They establish the existence of 
pure approximate equilibrium in games with sufficiently small maximal impact.
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implies that for any type-action character of player i, the difference in player i’s payoffs at c−i
and c′−i can be, at most, 
LB
N−1 . This implies that the λ-limited individual impact condition holds 
with λ = LB . 
LII is technically quite useful, as it implies that a certain law of large numbers (McDiarmid’s 
Bounded Differences Inequality) holds. We use this to prove asymptotic convergence to hindsight 
stability. To the best of our knowledge, this law of large numbers has not been used before in the 
economics literature, and can be very useful.13
3. Hindsight stability in large games
The main result of the paper is a robustness result. If we consider a family of games satis-
fying our regularity conditions, then any Bayesian equilibrium in this family is approximately 
hindsight-stable if a large number of players play the game. The formal statement of the result is 
as follows:
Theorem 1 (Hindsight stability in large games). Consider a family of games (T , A ) with 
a uniformly bounded strategy space and satisfying regularity conditions LC1 and LC2. Given 
ε > 0, there exist constants α = α(, ε), β = β(, ε) < 1 such that if σ ∗ is an equilibrium of a 
game G(N, T , A, τ, {ui}) ∈  then σ ∗ is (ε, αβN) hindsight-stable.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving this theorem. We do this in several steps. First, we 
restrict attention to a family games with a finite number of actions and types. We show that in any 
family of finite games satisfying condition LC2, the realized payoff of a player from any strategy 
must be “close” to the ex-ante expected payoff from that strategy, given the expected equilibrium 
play of his opponents. Using this result, we establish asymptotic hindsight stability of a particular 
class of approximate equilibria (that we call “strong approximate equilibria”) in this family of 
finite games. Finally, we use the regularity conditions LC1 and LC2 to show that a game with 
an infinite number of actions and types may be approximated by a finite grid reduction game, 
in which the number of types and actions is finite, such that equilibria of the infinite game are 
strong approximate equilibria in the finite grid reduction game. We then invoke our results about 
convergence to hindsight stability of strong approximate equilibria in finite games, to establish 
that equilibria of the original infinite game are also approximately hindsight-stable.
3.1. Games with finite type-action spaces
In this subsection, we restrict attention to games with finite type and action spaces. Consider a 
family of games ¯(T¯ , ¯A ) comprising games G(N, T¯ , A¯, τ, {ui}) where T¯ and ¯A are finite type 
and action spaces, and T¯ and A¯ are subsets of T¯ and ¯A , respectively. Suppose that ¯(T¯ , ¯A )
satisfies LC2.
Our first result is that, given any strategy profile, the realized payoff of any individual player i
from playing any strategy is “close” to the ex-ante expected payoff from playing that strategy, 
13 Recently, some related concentration results, like Hoeffding’s inequality, have been used in the learning literature: 
for instance, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [8]. McDiarmid’s inequality is a further generalization.
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player i and character ci = (ai, ti ), we defined the function ucii (c−i ) := ui(ci, c−i ). Further, we 
denote player i’s expected payoff given her type-action character by μcii i.e., μ
ci
i = E[ucii (c−i )].
Proposition 1 (Inequality for deviations from expected payoff). Consider a family of finite 
Bayesian games, ¯, that satisfies LC2. There exists λ > 0 such that, for any strategy profile 
σ of G(N, T¯ , A¯, τ, {ui}) ∈ ¯, the following is true:
For all i, ci, P rσ−i (
∣∣ui(c) − μcii ∣∣> α) ≤ 2e
−2(N−1)α2
λ2 .
Proof. We prove this proposition using an existing result called the Independent Bounded Differ-
ences inequality, which states that the probability that a function of independent random variables 
deviates from its mean by any quantity α is inversely proportional to the maximum impact that 
each random variable has on the value of the function. We present this result as a lemma below.
Lemma 2 (McDiarmid’s independent bounded differences inequality). Let X = (X1, X2,
. . . , XM) be a vector of independent random variables with Xk taking values in a set Xk for 
each k. Suppose that there exist constants lk (k = 1, . . . , M) such that the real-valued function g
defined on ∏Xk satisfies
|g(x) − g(x′)| ≤ lk whenever x and x′ differ only in the kth coordinate.
Let μ be the expected value of the random variable g(x). Then, for any α ≥ 0,
Pr(g(x) − μ ≥ α) ≤ e
−2α2∑M
k=1 l2k .
This result and its proof can be found in McDiarmid [19,20].14 We can apply McDiarmid’s 
Independent Bounded Differences Inequality to establish Proposition 1. To see how, first note 
that by Lemma 1, we know that the family of games satisfies the λ-limited individual impact 
condition – i.e., we can find a constant λ such that
for all i, for all c−i ∈ C−i , whenever c−i , c′−i differ only in one coordinate,
|ui(ci, c−i ) − ui(ci, c′−i )| ≤
λ
N − 1 .
Fix α > 0 and any ci . Applying Lemma 2 to the function ucii , we get the result. 
Proposition 1 makes transparent the role of condition LC2 (and the limited individual impact 
property). The limited individual impact property means that any player’s impact on a rival’s 
payoffs is bounded and, moreover, decreases with N . This implies, in turn, that the probability 
that a player’s realized payoff deviates from the mean by more than a specified amount vanishes 
exponentially fast with N . Therefore, the ex-post realized payoff from any action is very close 
to the ex-ante expected payoff from that action. We can use Proposition 1 to establish hindsight 
stability of Bayesian equilibria for the special case of finite games.
We present such a result below: Specifically, we establish that in a family of finite games satis-
fying LC2, a special class of approximate equilibria, that we call “strong approximate equilibria,” 
14 We are grateful to Michael Kearns and Colin McDiarmid for pointing us to this result.
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plies that any exact Bayesian equilibrium is also approximately hindsight stable if the number 
of players is large enough. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first robustness result in an 
environment without anonymity. 15 We will use these results later to prove hindsight stability of 
equilibria in the general case of infinite type and action spaces.
Before, we present the formal result, we define below the class of approximate equilibria in 
finite games. An approximate equilibrium (ε-equilibrium) was defined in Section 2. Below, we 
define (for finite games), a strong ε-equilibrium.
Definition 10 (Strong ε-equilibrium). For ε ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ ∗ is a strong ε-equilibrium 
if for each player i, for any type of player i that is realized with positive probability, ti , if pure 
action ai is played with positive probability by the type ti under σ ∗i , then ai must be an ε-best 
response to σ ∗−i , given ti .
Note that if ε = 0, this is just the definition of an (exact) equilibrium. It is also worth high-
lighting that, for ε > 0, if a strategy profile σ ∗ is an ε-equilibrium that prescribes mixed actions 
for some player i, it is not necessary that each of the actions in the support of player i’s equi-
librium strategy be an approximate best response. This is an important difference between an 
approximate equilibrium and an exact one. We have the following result about strong approxi-
mate equilibria in finite games.
Theorem 2 (Hindsight stability of strong approximate equilibria in finite games). Consider a 
family of finite Bayesian games ¯(T¯ , ¯A ) that satisfies LC2. Given ε > 0, and η ≥ 0, there exist 
positive constants α¯ = α¯(¯), β¯ = β¯(¯, ε, η) < 1 such that, if σ ∗ is a strong η-equilibrium of any 
N -player game G ∈ ¯, then σ ∗ is (2η + ε, α¯β¯N ) hindsight-stable.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and η ≥ 0 be given. Suppose that σ ∗ is an arbitrary strong η-equilibrium of 
an N -player game G in ¯(T¯ , ¯A ) satisfying LC2. Fix any player i and a type-action character 
ci = (ai, ti ), that is realized with positive probability in equilibrium (i.e. type ti has a positive 
probability of being realized, and ai is played with positive probability in equilibrium by type ti ). 
Since the type space is finite here, we need only consider positive probability types. Define 
Di,ci = {c−i : ui(c˜i , c−i ) −ui(c) > 2η+ε for some c˜i with t˜i = ti}. In other words, Di,ci denotes 
the rival type-action character profiles where player i with character ci = (ai, ti ) can unilaterally 
change her action choice and gain more than 2η+ε. Let Di denote ⋃ci Di,ci , and let D =⋃i Di . 
We will show that, as N becomes large, the probability of D goes to zero. Now,
u
c˜i
i (c−i ) − ucii (c−i ) =
(
u
c˜i
i (c−i ) − μc˜ii
)
+
(
μ
c˜i
i − μcii
)
+ (μcii − ucii (c−i )) .
If the first and last terms are both less than η+ε2 , and the second term is less than η, then the 
left hand side is less than 2η + ε.
We know, by the limited individual impact property and Proposition 1, for any characters ci
and c˜i , we have
15 We show that LC2 and uniformly bounded strategy spaces are sufficient conditions for hindsight stability in finite 
games. We leave unanswered the question of what a parsimonious necessary condition is. Clearly, some form of “conti-
nuity” will be necessary for hindsight stability.
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(
|uc˜ii (c−i ) − μc˜ii | ≤
η + ε
2
)
> 1 − 2e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2 , (1)
and similarly,
Prσ−i
(
|ucii (c−i ) − μcii | ≤
η + ε
2
)
> 1 − 2e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2 . (2)
Further, since σ is a strong η-equilibrium, we know that any action chosen with positive proba-
bility must be approximately optimal, given the type, i.e., μc˜ii −μcii ≤ η. From the complements 
of inequalities (1) and (2), it follows that,
Prσ−i
(
u
c˜i
i (c−i ) − ucii (c−i ) > 2η + ε
)
≤ 4e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2 .
Therefore, given a type of player i and a corresponding action that is realized in equilibrium, 
the probability that any deviation yields more than a 2η + ε gain for player i is, at most, 
4|C|e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2 , where |C| is the total number of possible type-action character profiles – i.e., 
we have Prσ−i (Di) ≤ 4|C|e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2
.
16 Therefore, Pr(D), the probability that any player 
can profit by more than 2η + ε by deviating is, at most, 4N |C|e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2
. Equivalently, we 
have shown that the strategies are 
⎛
⎝2η + ε,4N |C|e−
(η+ε)2
2 (N−1)
λ2
⎞
⎠ hindsight-stable. So, we have 
found constants α′ = |C| and β ′ = e− (η+ε)
2
2λ2 < 1 such that all equilibria are 
(
2η + ε,4Nα′β ′N−1)
hindsight-stable. Note that we can replace constants α′ and β ′ < 1 by bigger constants α¯ and 
β¯ < 1 so that Nα′β ′N−1 < α¯β¯N for all N . This completes the proof. 
Note that the above result immediately implies that any exact equilibrium of a family of finite 
games ¯(T¯ , ¯A ) that satisfies LC2, is also asymptotically hindsight stable. This is simply the 
special case of η = 0.
3.2. Finite grid reductions
Now, we return to the case of games with infinite type and action spaces. We will use our 
results on hindsight stability in finite games to establish hindsight stability of equilibria in the 
infinite case. Consider a Bayesian game G(N, T , A, τ, {ui}) in which the type and action spaces 
T and A are compact subsets of uniformly bounded type and action spaces T and A . Fix  > 0
small. We define a new game Gˆ that we call the -finite grid reduction. We need some additional 
definitions and notation.
For every x ∈ R, define r(x) := xˆ =  max{k : k ∈ Z such that k ≤ x}. For any x ∈ Rm, 
define r(x) := xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆm).
16 Notice that all parameters on the right hand side of this inequality are independent of the selected equilibrium σ∗ . 
Thus this bound holds uniformly for any selected strong η-equilibrium.
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ti ∈ Ti}, and Tˆ = ∏ Tˆi . Similarly, associated with the compact action space A, we define a 
finite action space Aˆi = {r(ai) : ai ∈ Ai}, and Aˆ =∏ Aˆi . Define the corresponding type-action 
character spaces Cˆi = Tˆi × Aˆi and Cˆ =∏ Cˆi . Similarly, we can also define Tˆ and ˆA .
Associated with the prior marginal distributions of types τi , define distributions τˆi over Tˆi such 
that τˆi (tˆi ) = τi(r−1(tˆi )). As usual, τˆ = (τˆ1, . . . , τˆn). For any character profile cˆ, define player i’s 
payoff uˆi (cˆ) = 12
[
supc∈r−1(cˆ) ui(c) + infc∈r−1(cˆ) ui(c)
]
. As before, let Uˆi(σ ) denote the expected 
payoff of player i from strategy profile σ .
We call the new game defined by Gˆ = (N, Tˆ , Aˆ, τˆ , uˆ) the finite -grid reduction of the origi-
nal game G = (N, T , A, τ, u). Compactness implies that Gˆ is a game with finite type and action 
spaces. For any strategy σi in the original game G, we can define an associated strategy σˆi in the 
-finite reduction Gˆ by σˆi (cˆi ) = σi(r−1(cˆi )). For a strategy profile σ of G, σˆ = (σˆ1, . . . , σˆn). 
Below, we establish some results about the relationship between a game G and its finite grid 
reduction Gˆ.
Proposition 2. Consider a family of games (T , A ), in which the strategy space is uniformly 
bounded, (with bounds kT and kA on the dimensionality of T and A , respectively), and payoff 
functions satisfy LC1 and LC2 (with constants K and L, respectively). Let G(N, T , A, τ, {ui})
be a Bayesian game from the family (T , A ), and let Gˆ be a -finite reduction of G. Then
(A) For every equilibrium σ of G, the associated strategy σˆ is a strong 2(kT + kA)(K +
L)-equilibrium of Gˆ.
(B) If σˆ is a (η, ρ) hindsight-stable equilibrium of Gˆ, then any associated strategy σ of the 
original game G is (η + (kT + kA)(K + 2L), ρ) hindsight-stable in G.
Proof. Proof of (A): Fix  > 0 small. We first show that, for any strategy profile σ of G and the 
associated strategy profile σˆ in the -finite grid reduction, Gˆ, and for any positive probability 
type tˆi of player i, the following is true:
|Uˆi(σˆ |tˆi ) − Ui(σ |r−1(tˆi ))| ≤ (kT + kA)(K + L). (3)
To see why, note that for cˆ ∈ Cˆ, and for any c, c′ ∈ r−1(cˆ), the conditions LC1 and LC2 imply 
that
|ui(c1, . . . , cn) − ui(c′1, . . . c′n)|
≤ |ui(c1, . . . , cn) − ui(c′1, c2 . . . cn)| + |ui(c′1, c2 . . . , cn) − ui(c′1, c′2 . . . cn)| + . . .
. . . + |ui(c′1, . . . , cn) − ui(c′1, c′2 . . . c′n)|
≤ K(kT + kA) + L
N − 1 (kT + kA) + . . . +
L
N − 1 (kT + kA)
≤ (kT + kA)(K + L).
Then, (3) follows from the definition of uˆi and Uˆi .
We will now use inequality (3) above to establish that σˆ is a strong 2(kT + kA)(K +
L)-equilibrium of Gˆ. We do this in two steps. We first show that it is an approximate equi-
librium, and then show that in particular, it is a strong approximate equilibrium. Now, suppose 
that σ is an equilibrium strategy profile of G. Let σˆ denote the associated strategy in the -finite 
reduction of G. Fix a player i and a type of player i that is realized with positive probability, tˆi . 
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deviates from σˆ . Now, we can find a corresponding strategy profile of the original game G, de-
noted by (σ ′i , σ−i ), which is identical to σ on all components except the i-th one, and for which 
(σˆ ′i , σˆ−i ) is the associated strategy profile in the finite reduction. Then, for every i, type tˆi and 
strategy σˆ ′i , we have
Uˆi(σˆ
′
i , σˆ−i |tˆi ) − Uˆi(σˆ |tˆi )
≤ Ui(σ ′i , σ−i |r−1(tˆi )) + (kT + kA)(K + L) − Ui(σ |r−1(tˆi )) + (kT + kA)(K + L)
≤ 2(kT + kA)(K + L),
where the second inequality follows from the fact that σ is an equilibrium of G. This establishes 
that σˆ is a 2(kT + kA)(K + L)-equilibrium of Gˆ.
Next we show, that in particular, σˆ is also a strong approximate equilibrium of Gˆ. The intu-
ition is that since the strategy profile σˆ is derived from an exact equilibrium σ of G, any action 
that is played with positive probability under σˆ is “close” to an action that is played with posi-
tive probability under σ , and therefore the payoff from any such action must be approximately 
optimal. We show this formally below.
Suppose that pure action aˆi is played with positive probability by type tˆi under σˆi . To prove 
that σˆ is a strong approximate equilibrium, we need to show that the pure action aˆi is an approx-
imate best response to σˆ−i given tˆi . Consider a potential deviation by player i given type tˆi to an 
alternate action a˜i . By construction of the -finite reduction and the associated strategy σˆ , we 
know that, given r−1(tˆi ), there exists action ai ∈ r−1(aˆ−i ) that is played with positive probability 
in the equilibrium σ of G, and we have
Uˆi(aˆi , σˆ−i |tˆi ) − Uˆi(a˜i , σˆ−i |tˆi )
≤ Ui(ai, σ−i |r−1(tˆi ))+ (kT +kA)(K +L)−Ui(a˜i , σˆ−i |r−1(tˆi ))+ (kT + kA)(K +L)
≤ 2(kT + kA)(K + L).
Note that the first inequality follows from the derivation of (3). The second inequality follows 
from the fact that σ is an exact equilibrium of G, which implies that any action ai that is played 
with positive probability must be an exact best response for player i given his type.
Proof of (B): Let Sˆ = {cˆ : no player can gain more than η by deviating from cˆ}. Let S = r−1(Sˆ). 
By definition of the finite grid reduction, Prσˆ (Sˆ) = Prσ (S). Further, since σˆ is (η, ρ) hindsight-
stable, we know that Prσˆ (Sˆ) ≥ 1 − ρ. Now, if a player cannot gain by more than η by deviating 
at cˆ, then at any c ∈ r−1(cˆ), she cannot improve by more than η + (kT + kA)(K + 2L). This 
follows from the proof of (3). Therefore, the probability that some player can deviate and make 
a gain of more than η + (kT + kA)(K + 2L) must be less than ρ. 
3.3. Establishing hindsight stability in the general case
We are now equipped to prove Theorem 1 – the central result of this paper that establishes 
hindsight stability of equilibria on games with infinite type and action spaces. Consider a family 
of games (T , A ) in which the strategy space is uniformly bounded, and payoff functions 
satisfy LC1 and LC2 with Lipschitz constants K and L, respectively. Fix ε > 0, small. Consider 
 = ε2(kT +kA)(5K+6L) . For this , we can derive the corresponding family of -finite reductions 
of games in , and denote it by ¯.
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reduction of G. We know from Proposition 2, that the associated equilibrium σˆ ∗ of Gˆ is a 
strong 2(kT + kA)(K + L)-equilibrium of Gˆ. Substituting for , we have that σˆ ∗ is a strong 
ε(K+L)
(5K+6L) -equilibrium of Gˆ. We can then apply our result about hindsight stability of strong ap-
proximate equilibria in finite games (Theorem 2) to ¯. Theorem 2 implies (for ε2 > 0) that there 
are constants α¯ and β¯ < 1 such that σˆ ∗ is ( 2ε(K+L)5K+6L + ε2 , α¯β¯N ) hindsight-stable in Gˆ. Finally, we 
apply part (B) of Proposition 2 to show that the original equilibrium σ ∗ is (ε, α¯β¯N ) hindsight-
stable. Note that the value of the constants α¯ and β¯ depend on the particular finite grid reduction 
and, therefore, depend both on the family of games  and on ε. In other words, given the family 
 and ε, we can find constants α := α(, ε) and β := β(, ε) < 1, such that any equilibrium σ ∗
of a game G ∈  is (ε, αβN−1) hindsight-stable. This establishes the main theorem.
4. Concluding remarks
Little was known about the stability properties of Bayesian equilibria in games with infinite 
types and actions, or in games that are not anonymous. In this paper, we study a class of Bayesian 
games in which the type and action spaces are infinite and players are not anonymous. We im-
pose two regularity conditions on the payoff functions – variants of Lipschitz Continuity – and 
show that this is enough to guarantee hindsight stability of equilibria if the number of players is 
large. Notice that these are sufficient conditions for hindsight stability. It would be interesting to 
investigate if, and in what sense, these conditions are also necessary.17
A promising line of research may be to study other ways of modifying the notions of stability 
and relaxing the restrictions on the family of games. For instance, we might consider an alternate 
notion of hindsight stability. The notion of hindsight stability in this paper requires that no player 
have an incentive to revise her action after learning all the information about the opponents’ 
types and actions. For full hindsight stability, this means also that players would not have an 
incentive to revise their choices after learning partial information about their opponent’s types 
and actions. However, as illustrated by an example in Kalai [15], this is not the case for approx-
imate (ε, ρ)-hindsight-stability. Even if an equilibrium is (ε, ρ)-hindsight-stable in the sense of 
this paper, there may still be partial information that reaches a player ex-post with probability 
greater than ρ, and based on this information, the player could increase her payoff by more than 
ε by a unilateral ex-post deviation. Strong (ε, ρ)-hindsight-stability of an equilibrium (see Kalai 
[15]) requires that there be no significant probability for ex-post unilateral revisions that lead 
to meaningful gains by individual players even after they obtain partial hindsight information 
about the play of the game. It is not clear whether this stronger condition holds for the family of 
games presented in this paper, or if other stronger properties such as structural robustness hold. 
We leave these issues out of the current paper, as addressing them would require the formulation 
of extensive versions of the game, which is significantly more difficult with a continuum of types 
and actions. It is also not clear if weaker robustness properties of Bayesian equilibrium would 
hold if types were not independent or if we had payoff functions that displayed discontinuities 
(see Gradwhol and Reingold [12], for example). This line of investigation would be particularly 
important for applications.
17 For instance, we use condition LC1 to extend the robustness result from finite games to infinite games, using the finite 
grid approximation method. It may be interesting to ask if there is a more direct proof that perhaps does not use LC1, but 
some alternate weaker condition.
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